INTRODUCTION
This chapter surveys the development of graphical models known as Bayesian networks, summarizes their semantical basis and assesses their properties and applications to reasoning and planning.
Bayesian networks are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) in which the nodes represent variables of interest (e.g., the temperature of a device, the gender of a patient, a feature of an object, the occurrence of an event) and the links represent causal influences among the variables. The strength of an influence is represented by conditional probabilities that are attached to each cluster of parents-child nodes in the network. Figure 1 illustrates a simple yet typical Bayesian network. It describes the causal relationships among the season of the year (X 1 ), whether rain falls (X 2 ) during the season, whether the sprinkler is on (X 3 ) during that season, whether the pavement would get wet (X 4 ), and whether the pavement would be slippery (X 5 ). All variables in this figure are binary, taking a value of either true or false, except the root variable X 1 which can take one of four values: Spring, Summer, Fall, or Winter. Here, the absence of a direct link between X 1 and X 5 , for example, captures our understanding that the influence of seasonal variations on the slipperiness of the pavement is mediated by other conditions (e.g., the wetness of the pavement).
As this example illustrates, a Bayesian network constitutes a model of the environment rather than, as in many other knowledge representation schemes (e.g., logic, rule-based systems and neural networks), a model of the reasoning process. It simulates, in fact, the causal mechanisms that operate in the environment, and thus allows the investigator to answer a variety of queries, including: associational queries, such as "Having observed A, what can we expect of B?"; abductive queries, such as "What is the most plausible explanation for a given set of observations?"; and control queries; such as "What will happen if we intervene and act on the environment?" Answers to the first type of query depend only on probabilistic ritzen, 1982; Wermuth and Lauritzen, 1983; Kiiveri et al., 1984) .
The role of the network in the applications above was primarily to provide an efficient description for probability functions; once the network was configured, all subsequent computations were pursued by symbolic manipulation of probability expressions. The potential for the network to work as a computational architecture, and hence as a model of cognitive activities, was noted in Pearl (1982) , where a distributed scheme was demonstrated for probabilistic updating on tree-structured networks. The motivation behind this particular development was the modeling of distributed processing in reading comprehension (Rumelhart, 1976) , where both top-down and bottom-up inferences are combined to form a coherent interpretation. This dual mode of reasoning is at the heart of Bayesian updating, and in fact motivated Reverend Bayes's original 1763 calculations of posterior probabilities (representing explanations), given prior probabilities (representing causes), and likelihood functions (representing evidence).
Bayesian networks have not attracted much attention in the logic and cognitive modeling circles, but they did in expert systems. The ability to coordinate bi-directional inferences filled a void in expert systems technology of the late 1970s, and it is in this area that Bayesian networks truly flourished. Over the past ten years, Bayesian networks have become a tool of great versatility and power, and they are now the most common representation scheme for probabilistic knowledge (Neapolitan, 1990; Spiegelhalter et al., 1993; Darwiche, 2009; Koller and Friedman, 2009) . They have been used to aid in the diagnosis of medical patients (Heckerman, 1991; Andersen et al., 1989; Geiger et al., 1990; Jiang and Cooper, 2010) and malfunctioning systems (Fenton and Neil, 2012) ; to understand stories (Charniak and Goldman, 1991) , to retrieve documents (de Campos et al., 2004) , to interpret pictures (Levitt et al., 1990) , to perform filtering, smoothing, and prediction (Weiss and Pearl, 2010) , to analyze gene expressions (Friedman et al., 2000) , genetic counseling (Uebersax, 2004) , semantic search (Koumenides and Shadbolt, 2012) , error-correcting codes (McEliece et al., 1998) , speech recognition (Zweig, 1998) , to facilitate planning in uncertain environments (Guestrin, 2003; Beaudry et al., 2010) , and to study causation, nonmonotonicity, action, change, and attention. Some of these applications are described in Pearl (1988) ; Russell and Norvig (2003) ; Buede (2009) .
BAYESIAN NETWORKS AS CARRIERS OF PROB-ABILISTIC INFORMATION

Formal Semantics
Given a DAG G and a joint distribution P over a set X = {X 1 , ..., X n } of discrete variables, we say that G represents P if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the variables in X and the nodes of G, such that P admits the recursive product decomposition
where pa i are the direct predecessors (called parents) of X i in G. For example, the DAG in Figure 1 induces the decomposition
The recursive decomposition in Eq.
(1) implies that, given its parent set pa i , each variable X i is conditionally independent of all its other predecessors {X 1 , X 2 , ..., X i−1 }\pa i . Using Dawid's notation (Dawid, 1979) , we can state this set of independencies as
Such a set of independencies is called Markovian, since it reflects the Markovian condition for state transitions: each state is rendered independent of the past, given its immediately preceding state. For example, the DAG of Figure 1 implies the following Markovian independencies:
In addition to these, the decomposition of Eq.
(1) implies many more independencies, the sum total of which can be identified from the DAG using the graphical criterion of d-separation (Pearl, 1988) :
Let a path in a DAG be a sequence of consecutive edges, of any directionality. A path p is said to be d-separated (or blocked) by a set of nodes Z iff: (i) p contains a chain i −→ j −→ k or a f ork i ←− j −→ k such that the middle node j is in Z, or,
(ii) p contains an inverted fork i −→ j ←− k such that neither the middle node j nor any of its descendants (in G) are in Z.
If X, Y, and Z are three disjoint subsets of nodes in a DAG G, then Z is said to d-separate X from Y , denoted (X⊥ ⊥Y |Z) G , iff Z d-separates every path from a node in X to a node in Y .
In Figure 1 , for example, X = {X 2 } and Y = {X 3 } are d-separated by Z = {X 1 }; the path X 2 ← X 1 → X 3 is blocked by X 1 ∈ Z, while the path X 2 → X 4 ← X 3 is blocked because X 4 and all its descendants are outside Z. Thus, (X 2 ⊥ ⊥X 3 |X 1 ) G holds in Figure 1 . However, X and Y are not d-separated by Z = {X 1 , X 5 }, because the path X 2 → X 4 ← X 3 is rendered active by virtue of X 5 , a descendant of X 4 , being in Z . Consequently, (X 2 ⊥ ⊥X 3 |{X 1 , X 5 }) G does not hold; in words, learning the value of the consequence X 5 renders its causes X 2 and X 3 dependent, as if a pathway were opened along the arrows converging at X 4 .
The d-separation criterion has been shown to be both necessary and sufficient relative to the set of distributions that are represented by a DAG G Geiger et al., 1990) . In other words, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of independencies implied by the recursive decomposition of Eq. (1) and the set of triples (X, Z, Y ) that satisfy the d-separation criterion in G. Furthermore, the d-separation criterion can be tested in time linear in the number of edges in G. Thus, a DAG can be viewed as an efficient scheme for representing Markovian independence assumptions and for deducing and displaying all the logical consequences of such assumptions.
An important property that follows from the d-separation characterization is a criterion for determining when two dags are observationally equivalent, that is, every probability distribution that is represented by one of the dags is also represented by the other:
Theorem 1 ) Two dags are observationally equivalent if and only if they have the same sets of edges and the same sets of v-structures, that is, head-to-head arrows with non-adjacent tails.
The soundness of the d-separation criterion holds not only for probabilistic independencies but for any abstract notion of conditional independence that obeys the semi-graphoid axioms Geiger et al., 1990) . Additional properties of DAGs and their applications to evidential reasoning in expert systems are discussed in Pearl (1988 Pearl ( , 1993a ; Pearl et al. (1990) ; Geiger (1990) ; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988) ; Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) ; Darwiche (2009); Lauritzen (1996) .
Inference Algorithms
The first algorithms proposed for probability updating in Bayesian networks used messagepassing architecture and were limited to trees (Pearl, 1982) and singly connected networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983) . The idea was to assign each variable a simple processor, forced to communicate only with its neighbors, and to permit asynchronous back-and-forth messagepassing until equilibrium was achieved. Coherent equilibrium can indeed be achieved this way, but only in singly connected networks, where an equilibrium state occurs in time proportional to the diameter of the network.
Many techniques have been developed and refined to extend the tree-propagation method to general, multiply connected networks. Among the most popular are Shachter's (1988) method of node elimination, Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter's (1988) method of clique-tree propagation, loop-cut conditioning (Pearl, 1988, Chapter 4.3) , interative conditioning (Darwiche, 2009; Dechter, 1999) .
Clique-tree propagation, works as follows. Starting with a directed network representation, the network is transformed into an undirected graph that retains all of its original dependencies. This graph, sometimes called a Markov network (Pearl, 1988, Chapter 3.1) , is then triangulated to form local clusters of nodes (cliques) that are tree-structured. Evidence propagates from clique to clique by ensuring that the probability of their intersection set is the same, regardless of which of the two cliques is considered in the computation. Finally, when the propagation process subsides, the posterior probability of an individual variable is computed by projecting (marginalizing) the distribution of the hosting clique onto this variable.
Whereas the task of updating probabilities in general networks is NP-hard (Rosenthal, 1975; Cooper, 1990) , the complexity for each of the three methods cited above is exponential in the size of the largest clique found in some triangulation of the network. It is fortunate that these complexities can be estimated prior to actual processing; when the estimates exceed reasonable bounds, an approximation method such as stochastic simulation (Pearl, 1987; Henrion, 1988) and belief propagation (Weiss and Pearl, 2010) can be used instead. Learning techniques have also been developed for systematic updating of the conditional probabilities P (x i |pa i ) so as to match empirical data (Spiegelhalter and Lauritzen, 1990; Darwiche, 2009 ).
System's properties
By providing graphical means for representing and manipulating probabilistic knowledge, Bayesian networks overcome many of the conceptual and computational difficulties of earlier knowledge-based systems (Pearl, 1988) . Their basic properties and capabilities can be summarized as follows:
1. Graphical methods make it easy to maintain consistency and completeness in probabilistic knowledge bases. They also define modular procedures of knowledge acquisition that reduce significantly the number of assessments required (Pearl, 1988; Heckerman, 1991) .
2. Independencies can be dealt with explicitly. They can be articulated by an expert, encoded graphically, read off the network, and reasoned about; yet they forever remain robust to numerical imprecision (Geiger, 1990; Geiger et al., 1990; Pearl et al., 1990) .
3. Graphical representations uncover opportunities for efficient computation. Distributed updating is feasible in knowledge structures which are rich enough to exhibit intercausal interactions (e.g., "explaining away") (Pearl, 1982; Kim and Pearl, 1983) . And, when extended by clustering or conditioning, tree-propagation algorithms are capable of updating networks of arbitrary topology (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988; Shachter, 1986; Pearl, 1988) .
4. The combination of predictive and abductive inferences resolves many problems encountered by first-generation expert systems and renders belief networks a viable model for cognitive functions requiring both top-down and bottom-up inferences (Pearl, 1988; Shafer and Pearl, 1990) .
5. The causal information encoded in Bayesian networks facilitates the analysis of action sequences, their consequences, their interaction with observations, their expected utilities and, hence, the synthesis of plans and strategies under uncertainty (Dean and Wellman, 1991; Pearl, 1993b Pearl, , 1994b .
6. The isomorphism between the topology of Bayesian networks and the stable mechanisms that operate in the environment facilitates modular reconfiguration of the network in response to changing conditions, and permits deliberative reasoning about novel situations.
Later Developments
Causal discovery
One of the most exciting prospects in recent years has been the possibility of using the theory of Bayesian networks to discover causal structures in raw statistical data. Several systems have been developed for this purpose (Rebane and Pearl, 1987; Pearl and Verma, 1991; Spirtes et al., 1993 Spirtes et al., , 2000 , which systematically search and identify causal structures with hidden variables from empirical data. Technically, because these algorithms rely merely on conditional independence relationships, the structures found are valid only if one is willing to accept weaker forms of guarantees than those obtained through controlled randomized experiments: minimality and stability Pearl, 2000, Ch. 2) . Minimality guarantees that any other structure compatible with the data is necessarily less specific, and hence less falsifiable and less trustworthy, than the one(s) inferred. Stability ensures that any alternative structure compatible with the data must be less stable than the one(s) inferred; namely, slight fluctuations in experimental conditions will render that structure no longer compatible with the data. With these forms of guarantees, the theory provides criteria and algorithms for identifying genuine and spurious causes, with or without temporal information.
Alternative methods of identifying structure in data assign prior probabilities to the parameters of the network and use Bayesian updating to score the degree to which a given network fits the data (Cooper and Herskovits, 1991; Heckerman et al., 1994) . These methods have the advantage of operating well under small sample conditions, but encounter difficulties coping with hidden variables. Tian and Pearl (2001a,b ) developed yet another method of causal discovery based on the detection of "shocks," or spontaneous local changes in the environment which act like "Nature's interventions," and unveil causal directionality toward the consequences of those shocks.
Plain beliefs
In mundane decision making, beliefs are revised not by adjusting numerical probabilities but by tentatively accepting some sentences as "true for all practical purposes". Such sentences, often named plain beliefs, exhibit both logical and probabilistic character. As in classical logic, they are propositional and deductively closed; as in probability, they are subject to retraction and to varying degrees of entrenchment (Spohn, 1988; Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1992) .
Bayesian networks can be adopted to model the dynamics of plain beliefs by replacing ordinary probabilities with non-standard probabilities, that is, probabilities that are infinitesimally close to either zero or one. This amounts to taking an "order of magnitude" approximation of empirical frequencies, and adopting new combination rules tailored to reflect this approximation. The result is an integer-addition calculus, very similar to probability calculus, with summation replacing multiplication and minimization replacing addition. A plain belief is then identified as a proposition whose negation obtains an infinitesimal probability (i.e., an integer greater than zero). The connection between infinitesimal probabilities, nonmonotonic logic, and interative belief revision is described in Pearl (1994a) ; Goldszmidt and Pearl (1996) ; Darwiche and Pearl (1997); Spohn (2012) .
This combination of infinitesimal probabilities with the causal information encoded by the structure of Bayesian networks facilitates linguistic communication of belief commitments, explanations, actions, goals, and preferences, and serves as the basis for qualitative planning under uncertainty (Darwiche and Pearl, 1994; Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1992; Pearl, 1993b; Darwiche and Goldszmidt, 1994) . Some of these aspects will be presented in the next section.
BAYESIAN NETWORKS AS CARRIERS OF CAUSAL INFORMATION
The interpretation of DAGs as carriers of independence assumptions does not necessarily imply causation and will in fact be valid for any set of Markovian independencies along any ordering (not necessarily causal or chronological) of the variables. However, the patterns of independencies portrayed in a DAG are typical of causal organizations and some of these patterns can only be given meaningful interpretation in terms of causation. Consider, for example, two independent events, E 1 and E 2 , that have a common effect E 3 . This triple represents an intransitive pattern of dependencies: E 1 and E 3 are dependent, E 3 and E 2 are dependent, yet E 1 and E 2 are independent. Such a pattern cannot be represented in undirected graphs because connectivity in undirected graphs is transitive. Likewise, it is not easily represented in neural networks, because E 1 and E 2 should turn dependent once E 3 is known. The DAG representation provides a convenient language for intransitive dependencies via the converging pattern E 1 → E 3 ← E 2 , which implies the independence of E 1 and E 2 as well as the dependence of E 1 and E 3 and of E 2 and E 3 . The distinction between transitive and intransitive dependencies is the basis for the causal discovery systems of Pearl and Verma (1991) and Spirtes et al. (1993) (see Section 3.4.1). However, the Markovian account still leaves open the question of how such intricate patterns of independencies relate to the more basic notions associated with causation, such as influence, manipulation, and control, which reside outside the province of probability theory. The connection is made in the mechanism-based account of causation.
The basic idea behind this account goes back to structural equations models (Wright, 1921; Haavelmo, 1943; Simon, 1953) and it was adapted in Pearl and Verma (1991) for defining probabilistic causal theories, as follows. Each child-parents family in a DAG G represents a deterministic function
where pa i are the parents of variable X i in G, and i , 0 < i < n, are mutually independent, arbitrarily distributed random disturbances. Characterizing each child-parent relationship as a deterministic function, instead of the usual conditional probability P (x i | pa i ), imposes equivalent independence constraints on the resulting distributions and leads to the same recursive decomposition that characterizes DAG models (see Eq. (1)). However, the functional characterization X i = f i (pa i , i ) also specifies how the resulting distributions would change in response to external interventions, since each function is presumed to represent a stable mechanism in the domain and therefore remains constant unless specifically altered. Thus, once we know the identity of the mechanisms altered by the intervention and the nature of the alteration, the overall effect of an intervention can be predicted by modifying the appropriate equations in the model of Eq. (5) and using the modified model to compute a new probability function of the observables. The simplest type of external intervention is one in which a single variable, say X i , is forced to take on some fixed value x i . Such atomic intervention amounts to replacing the old functional mechanism X i = f i (pa i , i ) with a new mechanism X i = x i governed by some external force that sets the value x i . If we imagine that each variable X i could potentially be subject to the influence of such an external force, then we can view each Bayesian network as an efficient code for predicting the effects of atomic interventions and of various combinations of such interventions, without representing these interventions explicitly.
Causal theories, actions, causal effect, and identifiability
Definition 2 A causal theory is a 4-tuple
set of observed variables
(ii) U = {U 1 , . . . , U m } is a set of unobserved variables which represent disturbances, abnormalities or assumptions, (iii) P (u) is a distribution function over U 1 , . . . , U n , and (iv) {f i } is a set of n deterministic functions, each of the form
where P A i is a subset of V not containing X i .
The variables P A i (connoting parents) are considered the direct causes of X i and they define a directed graph G which may, in general, be cyclic. Unlike the probabilistic definition of "parents" in Bayesian networks (Eq. (1)), P A i is selected from V by considering functional mechanisms in the domain, not by conditional independence considerations. We will assume that the set of equations in (6) has a unique solution for X i , . . . , X n , given any value of the disturbances U 1 , . . . , U n . Therefore the distribution P (u) induces a unique distribution on the observables, which we denote by P T (v).
We will consider concurrent actions of the form do(X = x), where X ⊆ V is a set of variables and x is a set of values from the domain of X. In other words, do(X = x) represents a combination of actions that forces the variables in X to attain the values x.
Definition 3 (effect of actions) The effect of the action do(X = x) on a causal theory T is given by a subtheory T x of T , where T x obtains by deleting from T all equations corresponding to variables in X and substituting the equations X = x instead.
The framework provided by Definitions 2 and 3 permits the coherent formalization of many subtle concepts in causal discourse, such as causal influence, causal effect, causal relevance, average causal effect, identifiability, counterfactuals, exogeneity, and so on. Examples are: * * * X influences Y in context u if there are two values of X, x and x , such that the solution for Y under U = u and do(X = x) is different from the solution under U = u and do(X = x ). * * * X can potentially influence Y if there exist both a subtheory T z of T and a context U = u in which X influences Y . * * * Event X = x is the (singular) cause of event Y = y if (i) X = x and Y = y are true, and (ii) in every context u compatible with X = x and Y = y, and for all x = x, the solution of Y under do(X = x ) is not equal to y.
The definitions above are deterministic. Probabilistic causality emerges when we define a probability distribution P (u) for the U variables, which, under the assumption that the equations have a unique solution, induces a unique distribution on the endogenous variables for each combination of atomic interventions.
Definition 4 (causal effect) Given two disjoint subsets of variables, X ⊆ V and Y ⊆ V , the causal effect of X on Y , denoted P T (y|x), is a function from the domain of X to the space of probability distributions on Y , such that
for each realization x of X. In other words, for each x ∈ dom(X), the causal effect P T (y|x) gives the distribution of Y induced by the action do(X = x).
Note that causal effects are defined relative to a given causal theory T , though the subscript T is often suppressed for brevity.
Definition 5 (identifiability) Let Q(T ) be any computable quantity of a theory T ; Q is identifiable in a class M of theories if for any pair of theories T 1 and
Identifiability is essential for estimating quantities Q from P alone, without specifying the details of T , so that the general characteristics of the class M suffice. The question of interest in planning applications is the identifiability of the causal effect Q = P T (y|x) in the class M G of theories that share the same causal graph G. Relative to such classes we now define:
Definition 6 (causal-effect identifiability) The causal effect of X on Y is said to be identifiable in M G if the quantity P (y|x) can be computed uniquely from the probabilities of the observed variables, that is, if for every pair of theories T 1 and T 2 in M G such that
The identifiability of P (y|x) ensures that it is possible to infer the effect of action do(X = x) on Y from two sources of information:
(i) passive observations, as summarized by the probability function P (v),
(ii) the causal graph, G, which specifies, qualitatively, which variables make up the stable mechanisms in the domain or, alternatively, which variables participate in the determination of each variable in the domain.
Simple examples of identifiable causal effects will be discussed in the next subsection.
Acting vs. Observing
Consider the example depicted in Figure 1 . The corresponding theory consists of five functions, each representing an autonomous mechanism:
To represent the action "turning the sprinkler ON", do(X 3 = ON), we delete the equation u 3 ) from the theory of Eq. (8), and replace it with X 3 = ON. The resulting subtheory, T X 3 =ON , contains all the information needed for computing the effect of the actions on other variables. It is easy to see from this subtheory that the only variables affected by the action are X 4 and X 5 , that is, the descendant, of the manipulated variable X 3 . The probabilistic analysis of causal theories becomes particularly simple when two conditions are satisfied:
1. The theory is recursive, i.e., there exists an ordering of the variables V = {X 1 , . . . , X n } such that each X i is a function of a subset P A i of its predecessors
2. The disturbances U 1 , . . . , U n are mutually independent, that is,
These two conditions, also called Markovian, are the basis of the independencies embodied in Bayesian networks (Eq. 1) and they enable us to compute causal effects directly from the conditional probabilities P (x i |pa i ), without specifying the functional form of the functions f i , or the distributions P (u i ) of the disturbances. This is seen immediately from the following observations: The distribution induced by any Markovian theory T is given by the product in Eq. (1)
where pa i are (values of) the parents of X i in the diagram representing T . At the same time, the subtheory T x j , representing the action do(X j = x j ) is also Markovian, hence it also induces a product-like distribution
where the partial product reflects the surgical removal of the
from the theory of equation (9) (see (Pearl, 1993a) ).
In the example of Figure 1 , the pre-action distribution is given by the product
while the surgery corresponding to the action do(X 3 = ON) amounts to deleting the link X 1 → X 3 from the graph and fixing the value of X 3 to ON, yielding the post-action distribution:
Note the difference between the action do(X 3 = ON) and the observation X 3 = ON. The latter is encoded by ordinary Bayesian conditioning, while the former by conditioning a mutilated graph, with the link X 1 → X 3 removed. This mirrors indeed the difference between seeing and doing: after observing that the sprinkler is ON, we wish to infer that the season is dry, that it probably did not rain, and so on; no such inferences should be drawn in evaluating the effects of the deliberate action "turning the sprinkler ON". The amputation of X 3 = f 3 (X 1 , U 3 ) from (8) ensures the suppression of any abductive inferences from X 3 , the action's recipient.
Note also that Equations (11) through (14) are independent of T , in other words, the pre-actions and post-action distributions depend only on observed conditional probabilities but are independent of the particular functional form of {f i } or the distribution P (u) which generate those probabilities. This is the essence of identifiability as given in Definition 6, which stems from the Markovian assumptions (9) and (10). Section 4.3 will demonstrate that certain causal effects, though not all, are identifiable even when the Markovian property is destroyed by introducing dependencies among the disturbance terms.
Generalization to multiple actions and conditional actions are reported in Pearl and Robins (1995) . Multiple actions do(X = x), where X is a compound variable result in a distribution similar to (12), except that all factors corresponding to the variables in X are removed from the product in (11). Stochastic conditional strategies (Pearl, 1994b) of the form do(X j = x j ) with probability P * (x j |pa * j )
where pa * j is the support of the decision strategy, also result in a product decomposition similar to (11), except that each factor P (x j |pa j ) is replaced with P * (x j |pa * j ).
The surgical procedure described above is not limited to probabilistic analysis. The causal knowledge represented in Figure 1 can be captured by logical theories as well, for example,
where x i stands for X i = true, and ab i and ab i stand, respectively, for trigerring and inhibiting abnormalities. The double arrows represent the assumption that the events on the r.h.s. of each equation are the only direct causes for the l.h.s, thus identifying the surgery implied by any action. It should be emphasized though that the models of a causal theory are not made up merely of truth value assignments which satisfy the equations in the theory. Since each equation represents an autonomous process, the content of each individual equation must be specified in any model of the theory, and this can be encoded using either the graph (as in Figure 1 ) or the generic description of the theory, as in (8). Alternatively, we can view a model of a causal theory to consist of a mutually consistent set of submodels, with each submodel being a standard model of a single equation in the theory.
Action Calculus
The identifiability of causal effects demonstrated in Section 4.1 relies critically on the Markovian assumptions (9) and (10). If a variable that has two descendants in the graph is unobserved, the disturbances in the two equations are no longer independent, the Markovian property (9) is violated and identifiability may be destroyed. This can be seen easily from Eq. (12); if any parent of the manipulated variable X j is unobserved, one cannot estimate the conditional probability P (x j |pa j ), and the effect of the action do(X j = x j ) may not be predictable from the observed distribution P (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Fortunately, certain causal effects are identifiable even in situations where members of pa j are unobservable (Pearl, 1993a) and, moreover, polynomial tests are now available for deciding when P (x i |x j ) is identifiable, and for deriving closed-form expressions for P (x i |x j ) in terms of observed quantities (Galles and Pearl, 1995) .
These tests and derivations are based on a symbolic calculus (Pearl, 1994a (Pearl, , 1995 to be described in the sequel, in which interventions, side by side with observations, are given explicit notation, and are permitted to transform probability expressions. The transformation rules of this calculus reflect the understanding that interventions perform "local surgeries" as described in Definition 3, i.e., they overrule equations that tie the manipulated variables to their pre-intervention causes.
Let X, Y, and Z be arbitrary disjoint sets of nodes in a DAG G. We denote by G X the graph obtained by deleting from G all arrows pointing to nodes in X. Likewise, we denote by G X the graph obtained by deleting from G all arrows emerging from nodes in X. To represent the deletion of both incoming and outgoing arrows, we use the notation G XZ .
Finally, the expression P (y|x, z) ∆ = P (y, z|x)/P (z|x) stands for the probability of Y = y given that Z = z is observed and X is held constant at x.
Theorem 2 Let G be the directed acyclic graph associated with a Markovian causal theory, and let P (·) stand for the probability distribution induced by that theory. For any disjoint subsets of variables X, Y, Z, and W we have:
Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations):
Rule 2 (Action/observation exchange):
Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions):
where Z(W ) is the set of Z-nodes that are not ancestors of any W -node in G X .
Each of the inference rules above follows from the basic interpretation of the "x" operator as a replacement of the causal mechanism that connects X to its pre-action parents by a new mechanism X = x introduced by the intervening force. The result is a submodel characterized by the subgraph G X (named "manipulated graph" in Spirtes et al. (1993) ) which supports all three rules.
Corollary 1 A causal effect q: P (y 1 , ..., y k |x 1 , ...,x m ) is identifiable in a model characterized by a graph G if there exists a finite sequence of transformations, each conforming to one of the inference rules in Theorem 2, which reduces q into a standard (i.e., hat-free) probability expression involving observed quantities.
Although Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 require the Markovian property, they can also be applied to non Markovian, recursive theories because such theories become Markovian if we consider the unobserved variables as part of the analysis, and represent them as nodes in the graph. To illustrates, assume that variable X 1 in Figure 1 is unobserved, rendering the disturbances U 3 and U 2 dependent since these terms now include the common influence of X 1 . Theorem 2 tells us that the causal effect P (x 4 |x 3 ) is identifiable, because:
Rule 3 permits the deletion
while Rule 2 permits the exchange
This gives P (x 4 |x 3 ) =
which is a "hat-free" expression, involving only observed quantities. In general, it can be shown (Pearl, 1995) that:
1. The effect of interventions can often be identified (from nonexperimental data) without resorting to parametric models, 2. The conditions under which such nonparametric identification is possible can be determined by simple graphical tests 1 , and, 3. When the effect of interventions is not identifiable, the causal graph may suggest nontrivial experiments which, if performed, would render the effect identifiable.
The ability to assess the effect of interventions from nonexperimental data has immediate applications in the medical and social sciences, since subjects who undergo certain treatments often are not representative of the population as a whole. Such assessments are also important in AI applications where an agent needs to predict the effect of the next action on the basis of past performance records, and where that action has never been enacted under controlled experimental conditions, but in response to environmental needs or to other agent's requests.
Recent Developments 4.4.1 Complete identification results
A key identification condition, which operationalizes Theorem 2 has been derived by Jin Tian. It reads:
Theorem 3 (Tian and Pearl, 2002) A sufficient condition for identifying the causal effect P (y|do(x)) is that there exists no bi-directed path (i.e., a path composed entirely of bi-directed arcs) between X and any of its children.
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Remarkably, the theorem asserts that, as long as every child of X (on the pathways to Y ) is not reachable from X via a bi-directed path, then, regardless of how complicated the graph, the causal effect P (y|do(x)) is identifiable. In Figure 1 , for example, adding unobserved confounders for the pairs (X 1 , X 3 ), (X 2 , X 4 ), (X 3 , X 5 ), and (X 2 , X 5 ) will still permit the identification of P (X 5 |x 3 ), but adding (X 2 , X 4 ) to this list will prohibit identification. Tian and Pearl (2002) further showed that the condition is both sufficient and necessary for the identification of P (v|do(x)), where V includes all variables except X. A necessary and sufficient condition for identifying P (w|do(z)), with W and Z two arbitrary sets, was established by Shpitser and Pearl (2006b) . Subsequently, a complete graphical criterion was established for determining the identifiability of conditional interventional distributions, namely, expressions of the type P (y|do(x), z) where X, Y , and Z are arbitrary sets of variables (Shpitser and Pearl, 2006a) .
These results constitute a complete characterization of causal effects in graphical models. They provide us with polynomial time algorithms for determining whether an arbitrary quantity invoking the do(x) operator is identified in a given semi-Markovian model and, if so, what the estimand of that quantity is. Remarkably, one corollary of these results also states that the do-calculus is complete, namely, a quantity Q = P (y|do(x), z) is identified if and only if it can be reduced to a do-free expression using the three rules of Theorem 2.
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This turns corollary 1 into an "if-and-only-if" assertion. Tian and Shpitser (2010) provide a comprehensive summary of these results.
Transportability and Transfer Learning
In applications involving identification, the role of the do-calculus is to remove the dooperator from the query expression. We now discuss a totally different application, to decide if experimental findings can be transported to a new, potentially different environment, where only passive observations can be performed. This problem, labeled "transportability" in (Pearl and Bareinboim, 2011) is at the heart of every scientific investigation. For example, experiments performed in the laboratory are invariably intended to be used elsewhere, where conditions differ substantially from the laboratory. A robot trained by a simulator should be able to use the knowledge acquired through training to a new environment, in which experiments are costly or infeasible.
To formalize problems of this sort, Pearl and Bareinboim devised a graphical representation called "selection diagrams" which encodes knowledge about differences and commonalities between populations. A selection diagram is a causal diagram annotated with new variables, called S-nodes, which point to the mechanisms where discrepancies between the two populations are suspected to take place. The task of deciding if transportability is feasible now reduces to a syntactic problem (using the do-calculus) aiming to separate the do-operator from a the S-variables.
Theorem 4 (Pearl and Bareinboim, 2011) Let D be the selection diagram characterizing two populations, π and π * , and S a set of selection variables in D. The relation R = P * (y|do(x), z) is transportable from π and π * if and only if the expression P (y|do(x), z, s)
is reducible, using the rules of do-calculus, to an expression in which S appears only as a conditioning variable in do-free terms.
Theorem 4 does not specify the sequence of rules leading to the needed reduction when such a sequence exists. Bareinboim and Pearl (2012) established a complete and effective graphical procedure of confirming transportability which also synthesizes the transport formula whenever possible. Each transport formula determines for the investigator what information need to be taken from the experimental and observational studies and how they ought to be combined to yield an unbiased estimate of R.
A generalization of transportability theory to multi-environment has let to a principled solution to "Meta Analysis." "Meta Analysis" is a data fusion problem aimed at combining results from many experimental and observational studies, each conducted on a different population and under a different set of conditions, so as to synthesize an aggregate measure of effect size that is "better," in some sense, than any one study in isolation. This fusion problem has received enormous attention in the health and social sciences, where data are scarce and experiments are costly (Pearl, 2012a,c) .
Using multiple "selection diagrams" to encode commonalities among studies, Bareinboim and Pearl (2013) were able to "synthesize" an estimator that is guaranteed to provide unbiased estimate of the desired quantity based on information that each study share with the target environment.
Inference with Missing Data
It is commonly assumed that causal knowledge is necessary only when interventions are contemplated and that in purely predictive tasks, probabilistic knowledge suffices. Not so. One predictive task in which causal information is essential and which have thus far been treated in purely statistical terms is the problem of drawing valid inferences from statistical data in which some items are "missing" or failed to be recorded.
The "missing data" problem is pervasive in machine learning and every experimental science; users fail to answer certain items on a questionnaire, sensors may miss certain signal due to bad weather, and so on. The problem is causal in nature, because the mechanism that determines the reasons for missingness makes a difference in whether/how we can recover from the data, and that mechanism requires causal language to be properly described, statistics is insufficient. Mohan and Pearl (2013) have shown that current practices of handling missing data, by relying exclusively on statistical considerations (Rubin, 1976; Little and Rubin, 2002) are deficient in several key areas, and could be remedied using causal diagrams. In particularly, they showed that 1. It is possible to define precisely what relations can be recovered from missing data and what causal and statistical knowledge need to be assumed to ensure bias-free recovery.
2. Different causal assumptions lead to different routines for recovering a relation from the data.
3. Adding auxiliary variables to the data, a popular technique in current practice (Schafer and Graham, 2002 ) may or may not help the recovery process, depending on conditions that can be read from the causal diagram.
4. It is possible to determine when the conditions necessary for bias-free recovery have testable implications.
Historical Remarks
An explicit translation of interventions to "wiping out" equations from linear econometric models was first proposed by Strotz and Wold (1960) and later used in Fisher (1970) and Sobel (1990) . Extensions to action representation in nonmonotonic systems were reported in Goldszmidt and Pearl (1992); Pearl (1993a) . Graphical ramifications of this translation were explicated first in Spirtes et al. (1993) and later in Pearl (1993b) . A related formulation of causal effects, based on event trees and counterfactual analysis was developed by Robins (1986 Robins ( , pp. 1422 . Calculi for actions and counterfactuals based on this interpretation are developed in Pearl (1994b) and Balke and Pearl (1994) , respectively.
Counterfactuals
A counterfactual sentence has the form If A were true, then C would have been true?
where A, the counterfactual antecedent, specifies an event that is contrary to one's real-world observations, and C, the counterfactual consequent, specifies a result that is expected to hold in the alternative world where the antecedent is true. A typical example is "If Oswald were not to have shot Kennedy, then Kennedy would still be alive" which presumes the factual knowledge of Oswald's shooting Kennedy, contrary to the antecedent of the sentence. The majority of the philosophers who have examined the semantics of counterfactual sentences have resorted to some version of Lewis' "closest world" approach; "C if it were A" is true, if C is true in worlds that are "closest" to the real world yet consistent with the counterfactuals antecedent A Lewis (1973) . Ginsberg (1986) , followed a similar strategy. While the "closest world" approach leaves the precise specification of the closeness measure almost unconstrained, causal knowledge imposes very specific preferences as to which worlds should be considered closest to any given world. For example, considering an array of domino tiles standing close to each other. The manifestly closest world consistent with the antecedent "tile i is tipped to the right" would be a world in which just tile i is tipped, while all the others remain erect. Yet, we all accept the counterfactual sentence "Had tile i been tipped over to the right, tile i + 1 would be tipped as well" as plausible and valid. Thus, distances among worlds are not determined merely by surface similarities but require a distinction between disturbed mechanisms and naturally occurring transitions. The local surgery paradigm expounded in Section 4.1 offers a concrete explication of the closest world approach which respects causal considerations. A world w 1 is "closer" to w than a world w 2 is, if the the set of atomic surgeries needed for transforming w into w 1 is a subset of those needed for transforming w into w 2 . In the domino example, finding tile i tipped and i + 1 erect requires the breakdown of two mechanism (e.g., by two external actions) compared with one mechanism for the world in which all j-tiles, j > i are tipped. This paradigm conforms to our perception of causal influences and lends itself to economical machine representation.
Formal underpinning
The structural equation framework offers an ideal setting for counterfactual analysis.
Definition 7 (context-based potential response): Given a causal theory T and two disjoint sets of variables, X and Y , the potential response of Y to X in a context u, denoted Y (x, u) or Y x (u), is the solution for Y under U = u in the subutheory T x . Y (x, u) can be taken as the formal definition of the counterfactual English phrase: "the value that Y would take in context u, had X been x," 4 Note that this definition allows for the context U = u and the proposition X = x to be incompatible in T . For example, if T describes a logic circuit with input U it may well be reasonable to assert the counterfactual: "Given U = u, Y would be high if X were low", even though the input U = u may preclude X from being low. It is for this reason that one must invoke some notion of intervention (alternatively, a theory change or a "miracle" (Lewis, 1973) ) in the definition of counterfactuals.
If U is treated as a random variable, then the value of the counterfactual Y (x, u) becomes a random variable as well, denoted as Y (x) of Y x . Moreover, the distribution of this random variable is easily seen to coincide with the causal effect P (y|x), as defined in Eq. (7), i.e.,
The probability of a counterfactual conditional x → y | o may then be evaluated by the following procedure:
• Use the observations o to update P (u) thus forming a causal theory T o =< V, U, {f i }, P (u|o) >
• Form the mutilated theory T o x (by deleting the equation corresponding to variables in X) and compute the probability
Unlike causal effect queries, counterfactual queries are not identifiable even in Markovian theories, but require that the functional-form of {f i } be specified. In Balke and Pearl (1994) a method is devised for computing sharp bounds on counterfactual probabilities which, under certain circumstances may collapse to point estimates. This method has been applied to the evaluation of causal effects in studies involving noncompliance, and to the determination of legal liability.
Applications to Policy Analysis
Counterfactual reasoning is at the heart of every planning activity, especially real-time planning. When a planner discovers that the current state of affairs deviates from the one expected, a "plan repair" activity need be invoked to determine what went wrong and how it could be rectified. This activity amounts to an exercise of counterfactual thinking, as it calls for rolling back the natural course of events and determining, based on the factual observations at hand, whether the culprit lies in previous decisions or in some unexpected, external eventualities. Moreover, in reasoning forward to determine if things would have been different a new model of the world must be consulted, one that embodies hypothetical changes in decisions or eventualities, hence, a breakdown of the old model or theory.
The logic-based planning tools used in AI, such as STRIPS and its variants or those based on the situation calculus, do not readily lend themselves to counterfactual analysis; as they are not geared for coherent integration of abduction with prediction, and they do not readily handle theory changes. Remarkably, the formal system developed in economics and social sciences under the rubric "structural equations models" does offer such capabilities but, as will be discussed below, these capabilities are not well recognized by current practitioners of structural models. The analysis presented in this chapter could serve both to illustrate to AI researchers the basic formal features needed for counterfactual and policy analysis, and to call the attention of economists and social scientists to capabilities that are dormant within structural equations models.
Counterfactual thinking dominates reasoning in political science and economics. We say, for example, "If Germany were not punished so severely at the end of World War I, Hitler would not have come to power," or "If Reagan did not lower taxes, our deficit would be lower today." Such thought experiments emphasize an understanding of generic laws in the domain and are aimed toward shaping future policy making, for example, "defeated countries should not be humiliated," or "lowering taxes (contrary to Reaganomics) tends to increase national debt." Strangely, there is very little formal work on counterfactual reasoning or policy analysis in the behavioral science literature. An examination of a number of econometric journals and textbooks, for example, reveals a glaring imbalance: while an enormous mathematical machinery is brought to bear on problems of estimation and prediction, policy analysis (which is the ultimate goal of economic theories) receives almost no formal treatment. Currently, the most popular methods driving economic policy making are based on so-called reduced-form analysis: to find the impact of a policy involving decision variables X on outcome variables Y , one examines past data and estimates the conditional expectation E(Y |X = x), where x is the particular instantiation of X under the policy studied.
The assumption underlying this method is that the data were generated under circumstances in which the decision variables X act as exogenous variables, that is, variables whose values are determined outside the system under analysis. However, while new decisions should indeed be considered exogenous for the purpose of evaluation, past decisions are rarely enacted in an exogenous manner. Almost every realistic policy (e.g., taxation) imposes control over some endogenous variables, that is, variables whose values are determined by other variables in the analysis. Let us take taxation policies as an example. Economic data are generated in a world in which the government is reacting to various indicators and various pressures; hence, taxation is endogenous in the data-analysis phase of the study. Taxation becomes exogenous when we wish to predict the impact of a specific decision to raise or lower taxes. The reduced-form method is valid only when past decisions are nonresponsive to other variables in the system, and this, unfortunately, eliminates most of the interesting control variables (e.g., tax rates, interest rates, quotas) from the analysis.
This difficulty is not unique to economic or social policy making; it appears whenever one wishes to evaluate the merit of a plan on the basis of the past performance of other agents. Even when the signals triggering the past actions of those agents are known with certainty, a systematic method must be devised for selectively ignoring the influence of those signals from the evaluation process. In fact, the very essence of evaluation is having the freedom to imagine and compare trajectories in various counterfactual worlds, where each world or trajectory is created by a hypothetical implementation of a policy that is free of the very pressures that compelled the implementation of such policies in the past. Balke and Pearl (1995) demonstrate how linear, nonrecursive structural models with Gaussian noise can be used to compute counterfactual queries of the type: "Given an observation set O, find the probability that Y would have attained a value greater than y, had X been set to x". The task of inferring "causes of effects", that is, of finding the probability that X = x is the cause for effect E, amounts to answering the counterfactual query: "Given effect E and observations O, find the probability that E would not have been realized, had X not been x". The technique developed in Balke and Pearl (1995) is based on probability propagation in dual networks, one representing the actual world, the other the counterfactual world. The method is not limited to linear functions but applies whenever we are willing to assume the functional form of the structural equations. The noisy OR-gate model (Pearl, 1988 ) is a canonical example where such functional form is normally specified. Likewise, causal theories based on Boolean functions (with exceptions), such as the one described in Eq. (16) lend themselves to counterfactual analysis in the framework of Definition 7.
The Algorithmization of Counterfactuals
Prospective counterfactual expressions of the type P (Y x = y) are concerned with predicting the average effect of hypothetical actions and policies and can, in principle, be assessed from experimental studies in which X is randomized. Retrospective counterfactuals, on the other hand, consist of variables at different hypothetical worlds (different subscripts) and these may or may not be testable experimentally. In epidemiology, for example, the expression P (Y x = y |x, y) may stand for the fraction of patients who recovered (y) under treatment (x) that would not have recovered (y ) had they not been treated (x ). This fraction cannot be assessed in experimental study, for the simple reason that we cannot re-test patients twice, with and without treatment. A different question is therefore posed: which counterfactuals can be tested, be it in experimental or observational studies. This question has been given a mathematical solution in (Shpitser and Pearl, 2007) . It has been shown, for example, that in linear systems, E(Y x |e) is estimable from experimental studies whenever the prospective effect E(Y x ) is estimable in such studies. Likewise, the counterfactual probability P (Y x |x), also known as the effect of treatment on the treated (ETT) is estimable from observational studies whenever an admissible S exists for P (Y x = y) (Shpitser and Pearl, 2009) .
Retrospective counterfactuals have also been indispensable in conceptualizing direct and indirect effects (Robins and Greenland, 1992; Pearl, 2001) , which require nested counterfactuals in their definitions. For example, to evaluate the direct effect of treatment X = x on individual u, un-mediated by a set Z of intermediate variables, we need to construct the nested counterfactual Y x , Zx(u) where Y is the effect of interest, and Z x (u) stands for whatever values the intermediate variables Z would take had treatment not been given. 5 Likewise, the average indirect effect, of a transition from x to x is defined as the expected change in Y affected by holding X constant, at X = x, and changing Z, hypothetically, to whatever value it would have attained had X been set to X = x .
This counterfactual formulation has enabled researchers to derive conditions under which direct and indirect effects are estimable from empirical data (Pearl, 2001; Petersen et al., 2006) and to answer such questions as: "Can data prove an employer guilty of hiring discrimination?" or, phrased counterfactually, "what fraction of employees owes its hiring to sex discrimination?"
These tasks are performed using a general estimator, called the Mediation Formula (Pearl, 2001 (Pearl, , 2012b , which is applicable to nonlinear models with discrete or continuous variables, and permits the evaluation of path-specific effects with minimal assumptions regarding the data-generating process.
